学术活动发布与订制系统

In the last decades the protection of animals played an increasing role in different societies. There are different reasons for these developments: 1.The industrial use of animals leads increasingly to severe criticism. 2. The modifications of animals in biotechnology make it possible to change the appearance of animals and to change essential features of the species, 3. Our knowledge about the mental, emotional and cognitive capacities of animals changes severely, 4. The basic moral framework is disputed and there are several attempts to include animals in our moral and political framework. The lecture will discuss several problems in that context.

1) Animal Ethics and Politics: What does the claim mean to include animal in our political framework? In the Netherlands we have the ‘party for the animals’ in the parliament. How would a political system look like that have a systematic representation of animals in the political system. What would it mean for the idea of citizenship? Does that not undermine the whole idea of political representation? In any case does each representation of beings in the political system make some assumptions about the moral status of beings.

2) Animal Ethics in utilitarian perspective: There are different concepts to justify the moral status of animals: Avoiding of suffering and promoting of animal welfare are the most basic ethical concepts. But how can we justify a moral obligation to prevent animals from suffering and to maximise the welfare of animals? The first possibility is the utilitarian approach to maximize happiness without asking who realizes these moments of happiness. One can wonder to what extent this approach makes it possible to understand at all what a moral obligation is and why we are morally obliged. Furthermore it is very implausible to defend a moral difference between humans and animals at all.

3) Animal ethics in the capabilities Approach: M. Nussbaum proposed in Frontiers of Justice to use the same framework we use to human beings for animals as well: Her approach is to see us morally obliged to protect those basic capabilities that are necessary to realize important human functions in order to live a flourishing life. She proposes to protect animals in the same way by protecting those capabilities that are necessary for them to realize their basic functions. The core of her concept is to develop a concept of dignity where the ‘horse dignity’ fulfils the same function for horses as the ‘human dignity’ for humans. But she denies non-human animals the same rights that we grant humans (e.g. killing of animals or performing experiments with them is in principle well acceptable). The concept is not consistent in itself.

4) Is there an animal ethics in the framework of the human rights?It is ethically problematic to deny a difference between humans and animals in the scope of utilitarianism. It is furthermore ethically problematic to use the same notions (rights and dignity) we apply on human beings to animals. But if that is true, is it then possible to defend a moral status of animals at all? I would assume that we need three steps for arguing for the moral status of animals:

c) If we have obligation towards other human beings and if it is possible that there is next to rights of the persons and the status of a thing a third possibility, than we could wonder what makes it plausible that we should take care about animals. The most plausible assumption would be that we share the vulnerability with animals. We and the animals are both vulnerable and embodied beings. Because of that vulnerability we can understand what it means for the animal to be hurt and when basic welfare opportunities are denied. It would have to be shown that this shared vulnerability makes that we are morally obliged with regard to animals.

5) Conclusion: Egalitarian and utilitarian ideas of animal status are undermining as well our understanding of politics as well our understanding of moral obligations. Attempts to transfer moral concepts we use with regard to humans just to animals are often conceptually implausible. It would be necessary to show in the first place that a) we have moral obligations at all, b) that these obligations are directed towards others, c) that there are possible defend a moral status of animals that is different from the specific status of human beings and d) that the vulnerability we share with animals is a sufficient reason to see us morally obliged to take animals into account.

Biographical note: Düwell, Marcus, (born in 1962) holds a chair for philosophical ethics at the department for philosophy at Utrecht University. He is research director of the Ethics Institute of Utrecht University, director of the Netherlands Research School for Practical Philosophy and director of the Utrecht research institute for philosophy, ZENO. He is coordinator of the research area “Conflicts and Human Rights” of Utrecht University. From 1993-2001 he was academic coordinator of the Interdepartmental Center for Ethics in the Sciences and Humanities at the University of Tübingen. His research interests include bioethics (especially ethics of genetics, environmental ethics) and basic questions of moral philosophy (foundations of individual rights, human dignity) and the relation between ethics and aesthetics. He is editor-in-Chief of the book series “Ethics and Applied Philosophy” (Springer publisher), editor-in-Chief of the Journal “Ethik in der Medizin”. At the moment het has three great research projects: 1. Human Dignity as the Foundation of Human Rights? (NWO 2011-2016), 2. What can the Humanities Contribute to Practical Self-understanding? (NWO 2011-2016), 3.Rights to a Green Future (ESF-Thematic Network, 2011-2015).