ABSTRACT

In competitive electricity markets, generating companies (GENCOs) offer their energy offers simultaneously to obtain the maximum profit on a daily basis.  We find the optimal solution to the individual GENCO’s problem using a bilevel noncooperative game model, implemented as a Mathematical Problem with Equilibrium Constraints (MPEC).  We also show that the market equilibrium, where each GENCO solves its own MPEC problem, can be set as an Equilibrium Problem with Equilibrium Constraints (EPEC). The nonconvex and nonlinear EPEC is approximated by a MILP problem. A search methodology is implemented to find the multiple Nash equilibria by adding linear constrains to the EPEC. Finally we show some examples to illustrate our MPEC and EPEC models.

Curriculum Vitae

Javier Contreras (IEEE Senior Member 05) was born in Zaragoza, Spain, in 1965. He received a B.Sc. degree in electrical engineering from the University of Zaragoza, an M.Sc. from the University of Southern California, Los Angeles, and a Ph.D. from the University of California, Berkeley, in 1989, 1992, and 1997. His research interests include power systems planning, operations and economics, and electricity markets. He is currently Associate Professor at the Universidad de de Castilla - La Mancha, Ciudad Real, Spain.