l         报告

One of the main impacts of quantum computation thus far has been its

potential implications for cryptography. Understanding which

cryptosystems are secure against quantum computers is one of the

fundamental questions in the field. A central concept in cryptography is

that of a zero-knowledge protocol. Recently Watrous [STOC'06] showed

that two specific well-known classical interactive protocols continue to

be zero-knowledge against quantum verifiers with quantum auxiliary

input. We greatly extends this result by showing that any problem $L$ in

Statistical Zero-Knowledge (SZK) has a fully classical protocol that is

SZK against both classical and quantum (possibly cheating) verifiers.

This answers an open question in [Watrous, STOC'06], and generalizes a

classical result by Goldreich, Sahai and Vadhan who showed that HVSZK =

SZK. As their result, ours does not depend on any computational assumption.

My talk will assume "zero knowledge" on quantum computing; the problem

will soon reduce to a purely classical task.

Joint work with Sean Hallgren, Alexandra Kolla and Pranab Sen.