特邀学术报告
报告题目： Mechanism Design for Demand-side Management in Next-generation Power Grids
智能电网需求响应中的机制设计
报 告 人： Prof. Yunjian Xu, Ph.D.
System Engineering and Design
Singapore University of Technology and Design
报告时间： 2014年7月4日，
星期五，上午9:30
报告地点： 清华大学西主楼3区102
主办单位： 清华大学电机系
联 系 人： 陈启鑫

Abstract: (报告内容)

Many states in the U.S. have set aggressive objectives on the fraction of generation from renewable sources that are inherently random and non-dispatchable. This talk presents my research efforts in designing incentives to induce the desired response in demand so as to absorb the variability in power supplied from intermittent renewable sources.

In this talk, we focus particularly on the design of market mechanisms for end-use devices whose energy demand is inherently deferrable in time. We propose a novel forward market for deadline-differentiated services, where consumers consent to deferred service of pre-specified loads in exchange for a reduced per-unit energy price. We explicitly characterize a joint scheduling and pricing scheme that yields an efficient competitive equilibrium between supply and demand. Somewhat surprisingly, we show that this efficient scheduling and pricing scheme is incentive compatible, in that every consumer would like to
reveal her true deadline to the supplier, regardless of the actions taken by other consumers.

Short Bio: (报告人简介)

Yunjian Xu received his PhD degree at MIT in 2012, under the supervision of John N. Tsitsiklis. Before joining the Singapore University of Technology and Design as an assistant professor, he worked as a postdoctoral scholar in the Center for the Mathematics of Information at California Institute of Technology for one year.

His research interests lie in energy systems and markets, with emphasis on the economics of price-responsive demand and the dynamic scheduling of storage-capable loads. He is a recipient of the MIT-Shell Energy Fellowship.