摘要
Communication privacy is an increasingly important goal in the diverse
Internet. Peer to peer anonymous networks can support the growing
demands of today's networking applications. In these dynamic networks,
the key challenge to anonymity arises from node dynamics and failures
that disrupt anonymous routing paths, forcing them to be rebuilt. Not
only do path rebuilds disrupt application sessions, but they also leak
information to passive attackers, who can degrade application anonymity
over time.  In this talk, we present two complementary ways to protect
anonymous communication against passive logging attacks such as the
Predecessor attack.  First, we discuss Bluemoon, a new anonymous
protocol that builds robust anonymous paths using persistent anonymous
links called "hooks". Resulting paths are stable and prevent information
leakage even under high network churn.  Second, we propose a way to
effectively block passive logging attacks by leveraging trust from
social networks.  We show how users can completely shield themselves
from traditional attacks, and can use optimized path selection
techniques to defend against customized hybrid logging attacks. We
evaluate both approaches using a combination of detailed analysis and
experimental validation, and show how both techniques can be used to
effectively secure anonymous communication in today's dynamic Internet.

报告人简历
Dr. Ben Yanbin Zhao joined the Computer Science department at UCSB in
2004, after completing his PhD work in computer science from UC
Berkeley. Before that, he received his MS from UC Berkeley (2000) and
his BS from Yale University (1997). His research focuses on security and
privacy, networked systems, social networks, and vehicular networks. Ben
received the NSF CAREER Award in 2005, was named one of the MIT
Technology Review Top 35 Innovators under 35 (TR-35) in 2006, and one of
ComputerWorld's Top 40 IT Innovators in 2007.