This couple of seminars, two hours each, constitutes a continuation of the short course I had given earlier in May 2015 on non-cooperative game theory. The two topics to be covered involve dynamic Nash equilibria and dynamic Stackelberg equilibria in dynamic games in discrete time. Counterparts in continuous time, for so-called nonzero-sum differential games will also be discussed, but briefly. The role of information structure in such dynamic games will be a centerpiece in the presentations. For the benefit of those who were not able to attend the short course in May, I will make these lectures self-contained. A background in dynamic optimization (such as optimal control) will be sufficient.  An outline of this series of lectures follows.

Outline:

• Dynamic games; informationally non-unique equilibria; weak and strong time consistency; subgame-perfectness; open-loop, feedback, and memory strategies; existence, uniqueness, and derivation of Nash equilibria under different information structures; linear-quadratic dynamic games

• Dynamic hierarchical (Stackelberg) games and equilibria; incentive strategies; mechanism design; complete information versus incomplete information games; applications in fair and efficient resource allocation through pricing